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CASE COMMENTS
COURTS-CRIMINAL CONTEMPT-ATtORNEY

WHO

MAILED QUES-

TIONNAIRFS TO GRAND JURY CONVICTED UNDER FEDERAL CONTEMPT

an attorney, was convicted of criminal contempt under the Federal Contempt Statute, 4 STAT. 487 (1831), 18 U.S.C. §
401 (1952), for mailing questionnaires to members of the grand
jury in order to obtain information on their stand with regard to
a basic policy question, to aid him in preparing his case. The
statute provides that the court has power to punish for "misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions." Held,
affirming lower court, that the grand jury is an arm of the court
and that D was directly engaged in the practice of the profession.
The dissent stated that D was not engaged in an "official transaction" within the meaning of the statute. Cammer v. United
States, 223 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
In the United States the problem of criminal contempt was
first brought to the forefront by the congressional impeachment
of district judge James H. Peck in 1831 for convicting an attorney
of contempt. Judge Peck was acquitted, but the repercussions of
his trial produced an inquiry into the broad powers given to the
inferior federal courts by the Act of 1789. 1 STAT. 83 (1789); see
Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 45 (1941). Representative
Joseph Draper of Virginia introduced a resolution for an inquiry
into the original judiciary act which gave the trial judge unlimited
and undefined discretionary powers to punish for contempt. Draper
demanded: "the law ought to be so clear, that every individual
may be able to look to the statute book, and know whether, in any
thing that he may do, he acts within the law or not." 7 CoNG. DEB.
560 (1830). This resolution resulted in the passage of the Act of
March 2, 1831, 4 STAT. 487, the clear purpose of which was to cur.
tail the previously undefined powers of the courts to punish for
contempt. Nye v. United States, supra, at 47. The present statute
is based on the legislation of 1831.
In applying this contempt statute to the facts of the case the
court had to ask: (1) was D an officer of the court, (2) engaged in
an official transaction, (3) whose conduct constituted misbehavior?
That there was misbehavior of some sort is not disputed, but it
would seem that to find, as the majority did, an affirmative answer
to the other two inquiries could only be done by overlooking an
accepted rule of statutory construction, namely, that when interpreting a penal statute the court should construe it strictly, i.e.,
against the state. Schmidt v. United States, 124 F.2d 177 (6th Cir.
1941). That the instant statute is penal, rather than remedial,
STATUTE.-D,
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there can be no doubt. Not only is it part of the Federal Criminal
Code, under Title 18, but its sanction is strictly punitive, rather
than compensatory. See Gompers v. Buchs Stove 8 Range Co., 221
U.S. 418, 443 (1911).
There is no doubt that an attorney is an officer of the court
when directly participating in a trial. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall.
333, 378 (U.S. 1866); but when D sent letters to the grand jury
investigating his clients, to obtain information, it could be reasonably argued that he was not an officer of the court engaged in
an official transaction as defined by the statute. As the dissent in
the principal case stated, attorneys are officers only when acting in
special capacities and not when engaged in any area of professional
activity. The court must be careful to guard against expanding
the interpretation of "official transactions" of "officers" of the court
beyond the ordinary meaning of the words, else the congressional
intent in framing this statute will be frustrated.
The majority failed to give much weight to a recent decision
to the effect that the contempt power of the inferior federal courts
should be strictly construed to avoid undue inroads "on the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights since contempts are summary in their nature, and leave determination of guilt to a judge
rather than a jury." In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945). Even
more recently, in Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d 312, 315 (1st
Cir. 1954) an influential court stated, "the grant of summary contempt power is... to be grudgingly construed, so that the instances
where there is no right to a jury trial will be narrowly restricted to
the bedrock cases where concession of the drastic power to the
courts is necessary to enable them to preserve their authority and
to insure the maintenance of order and decorum in the proceedings
before them." There is good reason for grave concern. Normally
a person accused of a crime is entitled to a notice and hearing. But
in summary contempt proceedings neither notice nor hearing need
be granted. The court acts not only as a prosecutor, but also as
judge and jury. Note, Summary Contempt: A Sword or a Shield?
2 STAN. L. REv. 763 (1950). All judges ought to be aware that
resort to such drastic measures should be restricted to none but the
most flagrant abuses, of a nature requiring instant action.
Where a case does not clearly fall within the purview of the
contempt statute, rather than to usurp the statute, an offended trial
court has two better modes of dealing with the offending attorney:
(1) Punishment can be had "under the Criminal Code, [35 STAT.
1113 (1909), 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1952)], where the accused would

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol58/iss1/9

2

P.: Courts--Criminal Contempt--Attorney Who Mailed Questionnaires to

CASE COMMENTS
be afforded the normal safeguards surrounding criminal prosecutions", Nye v. United States, supra, at 53; (2) the ordinary methods
for disciplining attorneys, such as suspension or disbarment,
could be used, as the dissent in the instant case stated at page 330.
It is submitted that courts use more restraint in the future,
and abstain from the extension of penal statutes ad infinitum,
particularly where the courts themselves are the immediate beneficiaries, i.e.,
in prosecutions for contempt of court.

M. J. P.

CRIMINAL LAW-INDICTMFENTS-INDORSEMENTS

ON REVERSE SIDE.

-D was indicted for rape. The indorsement on the indictment
was signed by the foreman of the grand jury and by the prosecuting
attorney, but it designated D as David Lee Hudson instead of
David Lee Huffman. When D was arraigned he moved to quash
the indictment for misnomer in the indorsement, as not fulfilling
the statutory requirements of an indorsement. W. VA. CODE c. 62,
art. 9, § 1 (Michie 1955). The court overruled the motion and,
at the instance of the prosecuting attorney, amended the indorsement by substituting the correct name of D. Conviction followed.
D assigns this action of the trial court as reversible error. Held,
that the misstatement of defendant's name was not fatal for the
statutory requirement that an indictment have the name of defendant endorsed on its reverse side is only directory. But the
requirement that the reverse side of the indictment be signed by
the foreman of the grand jury and attested by the prosecuting attorney is mandatory. Verdict set aside and a new trial awarded on
different grounds. State v. Huffman, 87 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1955).
The West Virginia legislature enacted the present statute,
hereinafter referred to as the indorsement statute, in the Code of
1931 which provided that an "indictment shall have legibly indorsed on the reverse side thereof the words 'State of West Virginia
versus .................... Indictment for a ..................
(Felony or Misdemeanor, as the case may be) ............... Foreman of the Grand Jury. Attest: .................. Prosecuting
Attroney of .................. county, West Virginia.'" W. VA.
CODE c. 62, art. 9, § 1 (Michie 1955). Prior to the enactment of
the indorsement statute, the rule in West Virginia was that the
indorsement is no part of the indictment other than a mark of
identification. State v. Thacker Coal & Coke Co., 49 W. Va. 140,
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